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This paper endogenizes both market transparency and product
di⁄erentiation in a model of informative advertising Æ la Grossman
and Shapiro (1984). We ￿nd, contrary to Schultz (2004), that an
increase in market transparency raises ￿rm pro￿ts but has no e⁄ect
on product di⁄erentiation. We also ￿nd that a move from exogenous
to endogenous market transparency is detrimental to welfare.
Compared to the Grossman and Shapiro model, with andogenous
product di⁄erentiation, ￿rms advertise more, di⁄erentiate their prod-
ucts more, charge higher prices and earn higher pro￿ts when the ad-
vertising cost is "not too low". This is because endogenizing product
di⁄erentiation relaxes price competition when the advertising cost is
not too low.
Keywords: Endogenous market transparency, advertising intensity, ex-
ogenous market transparency, product di⁄erentiation
JEL classi￿cation: L13, L15, M37
1 Introduction
Schultz (2004) studies the e⁄ects of increased market transparency on prod-
uct di⁄erentiation and competition in a Hotelling model of product di⁄er-
entiation. He ￿nds that increasing market transparency on the consumers￿
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1side leads to "less product di⁄erentiation, lower prices and lower pro￿ts" (p.
177). Since transportation costs decrease as ￿rms locate close together, he
thus concludes that increasing market transparency on the consumers￿side
is welfare improving.
In Schultz￿ s model, however, market transparency is exogenous. Firms
have no control whatsoever on the degree of market transparency. In practice
though, ￿rms have some in￿ uence. In particular, for consumer goods, ￿rms
generally have considerable in￿ uence on the degree of market transparency
through their advertising e⁄orts. Indeed, empirical and anecdotal evidence
show that ￿rms spend a fortune on advertising.1 It is important therefore to
investigate the implications of relaxing the assumption of exogenous market
transparency.
In Schultz (2004), market transparency is exogenous while product dif-
ferentiation is endogenous. On the other hand, in the Grossman and Shapiro
(1984) model and related models of informative advertising, market trans-
parency is endogenous but product di⁄erentiation is exogenous.2 Firms how-
ever typically choose both the reach of their advertising campaigns as well
as the extent of product diversity vis-￿-vis competing brands. This paper
endogenizes the choice of market transparency as well as product di⁄erentia-
tion. Our approach is to allow ￿rms to have full and sole control over market
transparency (as in, for example, Grossman and Shapiro (1984))3 and study
implications for the degree of market transparency as well as product dif-
ferentiation. In particular, we seek to address the following questions: How
much advertising will the ￿rms choose and will the ￿rms locate closer or
1For instance, Bagwell (2005) reports that: "in 2003 in the US, General Motors spent
$3.43billion to advertise its cars and trucks; Procter and Gamble devoted $3.32 billion
to the advertisement of its detergents and cosmetics; and P￿zer incurred a $2.84 billion
advertising expense for its drugs" (p. 3).
2See for instance Soberman (2004), Lal and Matutes (1994) and Ellison (2005).
3Generally, ￿rms do not have sole control over market transparency as consumers can
and often do (independently of ￿rms￿advertising e⁄orts) engage in information acquisition
activities that raise market transparency.
2further apart compared to Schultz (2004)? What are the implications for
welfare?
We ￿nd that, contrary to Schultz (2004), an increase in market trans-
parency raises ￿rm pro￿ts but has no e⁄ect on product di⁄erentiation. We
also ￿nd that endogenizing market transparency yields lower equilibrium
product di⁄erentiation, prices and pro￿ts ￿to the bene￿t of consumers. The
lower product di⁄erentiation and lower prices are driven by the business
stealing e⁄ect. The overall welfare e⁄ect is however ambiguous as pro￿ts are
lower.
The base model is then extended by endogenizing the choice of product
di⁄erentiation. We ￿nd that compared to Grossman and Shapiro (1984),
￿rms advertise more, di⁄erentiate their products more, charge higher prices
and earn higher pro￿ts when the advertising cost is "not too low". The
implications for consumer welfare however are not obvious: more consumers
are informed (good for welfare) but they pay higher prices (bad for welfare).
In addition, because ￿rms locate further apart, total transportation costs are
higher (bad for welfare). The net e⁄ect is thus unclear.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out
the base model (where ￿rms compete on product di⁄erentiation and prices
but cooperatively determine the level of market transparency). In section 3
we derive the equilibrium prices, market transparency and product di⁄eren-
tiation while section 4 synthesizes all the results and contrasts them to the
￿ndings of Schultz (2004). Section 5 extends the base model by allowing for
strategic advertising and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model and Preliminaries
Two ￿rms, ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2 are located along a linear city (whole real line,
R) with ￿rm 1 located at a and ￿rm 2 located at 1 ￿ b; with a ￿ 1 ￿ b
(together with Schultz (2004), we allow the ￿rms to locate outside the unit
interval). Once locations are chosen the ￿rms proceed to set prices p1 and p2
3and advertising intensity (market transparency), ￿ 2 [0;1] ￿choosing prices
noncooperatively while semicolluding on advertising (Simbanegavi, 2009).
We assume that advertising messages (ads) are randomly distributed over
consumers, that is, every consumer has an equal chance of receiving any
advertising message sent by the ￿rms.4 The marginal cost of producing a
unit of the good by ￿rm i;i = 1;2; is constant and equal to c: For simplicity,
we normalize the marginal cost to zero.
A mass of consumers with density 1 is uniformly distributed on the in-
terval [0;1]: Consumers have unit demands5 and are completely uninformed
about ￿rm locations and prices unless advertised. Each unit of the good gen-
erates gross surplus v ￿which is assumed large enough that there are no gaps
in the market, i.e., any informed consumer will purchase from one ￿rm or
the other. We assume that consumers face quadratic transportation costs ￿
paying t units per square of the distance traveled. Since ads contain informa-
tion about the relevant characteristics of both ￿rms, all consumers receiving
at least one ad are fully informed. Unlike Schultz (2004), we assume that
uninformed consumers do not purchase.6 This assumption is necessary since
the ￿rms jointly decide on the level of market transparency (advertising is a
public good). If uninformed consumers would be split equally between the
￿rms, then the free rider problem dictate that neither ￿rm invest in market
transparency.
Schultz (2004) de￿nes market transparency as "the fraction of consumers
that are informed about [￿rms￿ ] prices and product characteristics (p. 174).
However, the mode by which consumers become informed is not explicitly
4We also assume that advertising conveys all the relevant characteristics/information
of both ￿rms ￿hence no ￿rm has a "captive" market.
5Each consumer consumes either one unit or zero units of the good.
6This assumption can be justi￿ed in at least two situations. First, if the product is a new
innovation, then consumers who did not receive advertising may not want to search since
they do not know the attributes of this product or are unaware of its existence. Second,
uninformed consumers may choose not to search if third degree price discrimination is
possible (discount coupons). In this case, a consumer with no coupon will have to pay the
reservation price, v: Since visitation is costly, uninformed consumers will not purchase.
4modeled. Consumers learn or become informed about prices and product
characteristics either through search, word of mouth or through advertising
by ￿rms. In this paper we take the latter view. We assume that search
costs are prohibitively high and therefore consumers rely for their informa-
tion on ￿rm advertising. In this paper, advertising intensity, ￿; denotes the
fraction/proportion of consumers that are fully informed about the ￿ relevant￿
characteristics of both ￿rms￿products.7 This leaves fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of con-
sumers uninformed. Let A(￿) be the cost of informing a fraction ￿ of the
market. We assume that @A(￿)=@￿ > 0 and @2A(￿)=@￿
2 > 0: For what fol-
lows, we assume a quadratic functional form for the advertising cost function;
that is, A(￿i) = ￿￿
2
i=2; where ￿ is the advertising cost parameter.
For brevity, let ‘i;‘j = fa;bg;i;j = 1;2;j 6= i: The above model gives
rise to the following demands (see Schultz (2004)):
Di (p1;p2;a;b;￿) = ￿
￿




2t(1 ￿ ‘i ￿ ‘j)
￿
: (1)
3 Prices, market transparency and product di⁄erentiation
Given the model above, the ￿rms￿interaction can be modeled as a two stage
game in which the ￿rms choose locations (product di⁄erentiation) in the ￿rst
stage (Stage I) and thereafter, after observing each other￿ s location choices,
the ￿rms simultaneously choose prices and market transparency (Stage II).
We solve the problem backwards, starting with Stage II.
3.1 Prices and market transparency
Given product di⁄erentiation (locations), ￿rms simultaneously decide on
prices and market transparency, choosing prices noncooperatively but co-
operatively choosing the advertising intensity (market transparency).
7There is thus an exact equivalence between our measure of advertising intensity, ￿;
and Schultz￿ s measure of market transparency, ￿
S; where S is a mnemonic for Schultz.
5The assumption of semicollusion on advertising that we adopt here de-
serves some explanation ￿as a more natural assumption would seem to be
that advertising levels are chosen noncooperatively. Our assumption here is
motivated by the desire to make our model as comparable to Schultz (2004)
as possible to allow us to pin down the implications of endogenizing market
transparency. In Schultz (2004), market transparency is de￿ned as the pro-
portion of consumers that are informed about the ￿rms￿prices and product
characteristics. Of course, since market transparency is exogenous in Schultz
(2004), there is no advertising. However, as argued above, his measure of
market transparency is exactly the same as our "cooperative" advertising
intensity.
In Section 5 we present results of the more general model (￿rms compete
in prices, advertising and locations). As we will see there, the model quickly
becomes messy and less tractable.
3.1.1 Market transparency
A novelty of this paper is that we de￿ne more precisely the notion of mar-
ket transparency and in particular, we make it clear that ￿rms are largely
responsible for "creating" market transparency through their advertising ef-
forts. Firms choose advertising, ￿; to maximize joint pro￿t ￿ ￿ ￿1 + ￿2;
given locations and prices. The ￿rms￿objective function for advertising is:
￿ ￿ ￿
 









Taking the ￿rst order condition with respect to ￿ and simplifying gives
(pj ￿ pi)
￿








￿4t￿￿(1 ￿ ‘i ￿ ‘j)￿2t(‘ipj + ‘jpi)+tpi+tpj = 0:
(3)
63.1.2 Prices
In the pricing game, ￿rm￿ s objective functions are given by
￿i = pi￿
￿










;i;j = 1;2;j 6= i; (4)




i ￿ 2t‘i ￿ t‘
2
j + t + pi ￿ 2pj = 0;i;j = 1;2;j 6= i (5)
It is immediate from (5) that prices are independent of the advertising
level. This is because advertising is non-strategic in the current framework.
Solving the ￿rst order conditions (3) and (5) simultaneously for ￿;pi;i =
1;2; gives:






t;i;j = 1;2;j 6= i (6)
￿(‘i;‘j) =








We see from (6) that, for given locations, equilibrium prices are increasing
in transportation costs, t: The parameter t is a measure of the degree of
exogenous product di⁄erentiation and a higher t implies a softening of price
competition. Also, for given locations, the advertising intensity is higher the
higher is t: This is because an increase in t, other things being equal, softens
price competition and thus raises the pro￿t margin. As pro￿tability increases,
￿rms want to sell more and this can only be realised through increasing the
advertising intensity (to expand the size of the market). Also from (7), it is
immediate that market transparency decreases as the cost of advertising (￿)
increases.
As shown by Schultz (2004), the prices that would emerge under exoge-
7nous market transparency are (p. 176)
p
S









where superscript S is a mnemonic for Schultz.
It is immediate from (6) and (8) that, for given locations ‘i and ‘j, prices
are higher when market transparency is exogenous relative to when it is en-
dogenous (1=￿ > 1 since ￿ 2 (0;1)). In other words, price setting in the
second stage is more competitive when ￿rms set both price and advertising
as opposed to when advertising is exogenously determined. This is intuitive.
With endogenous market transparency, ￿rms compete more aggressively as
each ￿rm wants to recoup its advertising outlays. Put di⁄erently, ￿rms price
aggressively in the hope of expanding own demand (business stealing e⁄ect).
In contrast, when market transparency is exogenous, ￿rms incur no adver-
tising expenses and thus there is relatively less incentive to undercut.
3.2 Product di⁄erentiation/Locations
Anticipating Bertrand competition in prices and semicollusion on advertising
in the second stage, ￿rms choose their locations noncooperatively in Stage I.
Firm i￿ s optimal location problem is given by
￿i = pi￿
￿










;i;j = 1;2;j 6= i;
where pi;pj and ￿ are given by (6) and (7) respectively. Taking the ￿rst
order condition of ￿rm i￿ s objective function with respect to ‘i;i = 1;2;
and solving the ￿rst order conditions simultaneously for ‘i and ‘j yields
‘￿
i = ‘￿
j = ￿1=4 as the unique (and symmetric) equilibrium in locations.
Reverting to familiar notation, this can be written as
a
￿ = b
￿ = ￿1=4 (9)
8Since a￿ and b￿ are negative, we conclude (as did Schultz (2004)) that
￿rms will locate outside the unit interval. However, since a￿ = b￿ < ￿1; we
conclude that ￿rms di⁄erentiate their products but not fully. This could be
interpretted as ￿rms wanting to be where demand is (Tirole (1988: 286)).
Hotelling (1929) espoused the principle of minimumdi⁄erentiation ￿show-
ing that when consumers face linear transportation costs and ￿rms are re-
stricted to locate on the unit interval, the ￿rms will locate at the centre.
There are two opposing forces at play here. Locating further apart softens
price competition ￿a strategic e⁄ect. Intuitively, consumers located close to
￿rm 1 become more captive as ￿rms locate further apart (a decreases). Con-
sequently each ￿rm has more "monopoly power" over the consumers located
on its turf and thus can a⁄ord to charge higher prices. On the other hand,
other things being equal, if ￿rm 1 is located to the left of the point 1=2, its
market share increases as it moves (locates) towards the centre. In e⁄ect,
￿rm 1 does strictly better if it can locate to the right of point 1/2 so that
it serves more than half of the market. Of course ￿rm 2 behaves symmetri-
cally and thus ￿rms have an incentive to locate close together. This is the
market share/business stealing e⁄ect (Tirole (1988)). In the case of linear
transport costs (Hotelling￿ s example), the market share e⁄ect dominates and
￿rms locate at the center.8
D￿ Aspremont et al (1979) however showed that when consumers face
quadratic transportation costs (as in the present paper) and ￿rms are re-
stricted to locate on the interval [0,1], ￿rms will choose maximal di⁄eren-
tiation. That is, ￿rm 1 will locate at point 0 while ￿rm 2 will locate at
point 1 (i.e., the strategic e⁄ect dominates). In particular, it can be shown
(D￿ Aspremont et al (1979: 1149); Tirole (1988: 281)) that in the case of
quadratic transportation costs, the ￿rms￿pro￿ts are strictly decreasing in
8D￿ Aspremont et al (1979) however show that when transport costs are linear, the
principle of minimum di⁄erentiation is invalid (at least in pure strategies) (p. 1145). This
is because, with linear transport costs, the ￿rms￿pro￿t functions are discontinuous and
consequently, the price competition problem is not well behaved (p. 1146).
9own location so that locating at points 0 and 1 (as in D￿ Aspremont et al
1979) is only constrained optimal. In other words, the strategic e⁄ect is so
strong that ￿rms would want to di⁄erentiate their products further than is
permitted by the restriction [0,1].
4 Analysis
4.1 Equilibrium prices, market transparency and pro￿ts
Given the equilibrium locations above (cf. (9)), we can now characterize the
￿rms￿optimal level of market transparency as well as the equilibrium prices





2 = 3t=2 (10)
￿
￿ = 3t=4￿: (11)
Observe from (9) and (10) that the equilibrium price and locations are
una⁄ected by the advertising cost parameter, ￿: Although it appears counter-
intuitive at ￿rst, this is in fact as one would expect: advertising is non-
strategic in the current set-up. This is because all the consumers in the
market have the same ￿ information set￿about the ￿rms￿prices and product
characteristics. In this sense, advertising here can be thought of as a common
￿xed cost.9 Also from (11), market transparency will be higher the lower is
the per unit advertising cost, ￿: This is intuitive. A higher ￿ means that
it is more costly to inform consumers and as a result, ￿rms will respond by
lowering the level of market transparency, other things being equal.10
9In Section 5 below we present a model where consumers are di⁄erentially informed
about the ￿rms￿prices and products characteristics ￿thus giving advertising a strategic
dimension.
10Observe that from (11), we can pin down the permissible range for ￿: Since ￿ 2 [0;1];
we have that ￿
￿ = 3t
4￿ ￿ 1 ￿implying that ￿ ￿ 3t
4 : For ￿ > 3t
4 ; ￿ 2 (0;1) and some
consumers are uninformed in equilibrium.
10Substituting p￿;￿




As one would expect, pro￿ts increase with the transportation cost, t; but
decrease with the advertising cost, ￿. Below we summarize the comparative
statics e⁄ects of changes in the advertising cost on product di⁄erentiation,
competition and pro￿ts:
Proposition 1 A decrease in the advertising cost parameter ￿ at equilib-
rium raises ￿rms￿pro￿ts and the advertising intensity but has no e⁄ect on
product di⁄erentiation and competition (prices). Consequently, a decrease in
￿ unambiguously raises social welfare.
This result closely mirrors Theorem 1 in Schultz (2004). When the cost
of advertising decreases, ￿rms respond by raising the advertising intensity
thereby growing the market. Since advertising is non-strategic, an increase
in the advertising intensity does not directly translate into either more or
less price competition or more or less product di⁄erentiation. However, be-
cause more consumers become informed when the advertising cost decreases,
consumers are unambiguously better o⁄.
Given the relationship between our measure of market transparency and
the advertising cost parameter, ￿ (cf. (11)); the above theorem can be re-
stated in a somewhat less parsimonious way, but a way that allows for a
direct comparison with Schultz￿ s (2004) Theorem 1 as follows: An increase
in market transparency at equilibrium (decrease in ￿) raise ￿rms￿pro￿ts but
has no e⁄ect on product di⁄erentiation and prices. Moreover, an increase
in market transparency unambiguously raises welfare. This result, as stated,
contrasts sharply with Schultz￿ s Theorem 1 (2004: 177) which states that
an increase in market transparency leads to less product di⁄erentiation and
lower prices and pro￿ts. Here we show that an increase in market trans-
parency is bene￿cial (rather than harmful) to ￿rms. The intuition can be
11gleaned from the envelope result: a change in ￿ has no ￿rst order (direct)
e⁄ect on the ￿rms￿revenues since both the prices and market transparency
are chosen optimally. A ￿rst order e⁄ect only appears in the advertising cost
function, A(￿), where a decrease in ￿ directly lowers the advertising outlay.
This raises ￿rms￿pro￿ts. Moreover, a decrease in ￿ does not directly impact
prices yet it directly raises consumer welfare (more consumers are informed).
Consequently, an increase in market transparency is welfare improving.
4.2 Comparisons with Schultz (2004)
One motivation of this paper is to examine the implications on product dif-
ferentiation, competition and pro￿tability of relaxing the assumption of ex-
ogenous market transparency. We compare our results for these variables (9)
￿(12)) to those of Schultz (2004). See the appendix for details.
We compare the ￿rms￿locations (aS and a￿) given the optimal level of
market transparency, ￿
￿.11 In the choice of location, two opposing consider-
ations are at play: On the one hand, for given prices and advertising, each
￿rm would like to locate close to the competitor as this enhances business
stealing. On the other hand, for given advertising intensity, ￿; ￿rms realize
that locating close together squeezes margins and therefore ￿rms would want
to increase product di⁄erentiation in order to soften price competition. We
￿nd that, although ￿rms locate outside the unit interval, they locate close
together than is implied by Schultz (2004). Put di⁄erently, the business
stealing e⁄ect is stronger under endogenous market transparency.
We next compare prices pS and p￿: The question we seek to answer is
whether endogenizing market transparency carries with it procompetitive ef-
fects or otherwise. We ￿nd that prices are lower when market transparency
is endogenous. In other words, price competition is tougher under endoge-
nous market transparency. The explanation is as follows: because ￿rms incur
11Variables with a superscript S are the equilibrium quantities as computed by Schultz
(2004), see appendix for details.
12advertising expenses, for given advertising intensity, ￿; there is greater incen-
tive to undercut the competitor in order to "steal" the competitor￿ s market
share and hence increase own pro￿ts (the business stealing e⁄ect). Lastly, we
compare pro￿ts under endogenous and those under exogenous market trans-
parency (￿S and ￿￿). We ￿nd that ￿rms earn lower pro￿ts if they advertise
to inform consumers. The low pro￿ts can be explained by the following:
First, ￿rms incur advertising costs which tend to lower pro￿ts, other things
being equal and second, products are less di⁄erentiated and therefore price
competition is much tougher than under exogenous market transparency and
third, the fact that uninformed consumers do not purchase makes the market
thinner (compared to Schultz (2004))
The following proposition summarizes the implications of endogenizing
market transparency, in particular, how the equilibrium locations, prices and
pro￿ts compare with those when market transparency is exogenous.
Proposition 2 Let market transparency be given by (11). When ￿rms ad-
vertise to inform the market (endogenous market transparency) product dif-
ferentiation, prices and pro￿ts are lower than under exogenous market trans-
parency. However, consumers are better o⁄ since for given advertising in-
tensity (market transparency), they pay lower prices.
Observe that in Schultz (2004), ￿rms incur no advertising expenses. The
fact that ￿rm pro￿ts are lower, coupled with the fact that uninformed con-
sumers do not purchase points to lower social welfare under endogenous mar-
ket transparency. However, tough price competition mitigates the tendency
to lower welfare as tough price competition implies greater consumer sur-
plus. In addition to paying lower prices, on average each consumer travels a
shorter distance than under exogenous market transparency. This lowers ag-
gregate transportation costs (good for welfare). It follows therefore that the
welfare e⁄ect of moving from exogenous to endogenous market transparency
is ambiguous.
135 Strategic Advertising
We extend the model to allow for strategic advertising. In particular, in
addition to competing on prices and product di⁄erentiation, ￿rms also com-
pete on advertising.12 This case is interesting as it allows for di⁄erentially
informed consumers and thus gives a strategic dimension to advertising.
Let ￿1 and ￿2 be, respectively, ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2￿ s advertising intensities.
Given these advertising intensities, the market is delineated as follows; frac-
tion ￿1￿2 of consumers receive advertising messages from both ￿rms and is




;i;j = 1;2;j 6= i receive ads from
￿rm i but not ￿rm j and is thus partially informed (consumers captive to
￿rm i) and fraction (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) receive no ads from either ￿rm (unin-
formed). We assume that ￿1￿2 is large enough so that ￿rms ￿nd it worthwhile
to compete for the fully informed consumers.
Fully informed consumers purchase from whichever ￿rm guarantees them
the greatest surplus while partially informed consumers purchase whenever
it is individually rational to do so. Given prices pi and pj; and locations ‘i

















￿ v ￿ pi
t(1 ￿ ‘i)
2
from the fully and respectively partially informed consumers. However, if
v ￿pi ￿t(1 ￿ ‘i)
2 ￿ 0; all consumers who receive at least one ad from ￿rm i





:13 Thus the total demand
12In this sense this section amounts to an extension of the model of Grossman and
Shapiro (1984) to allow for endogenous product di⁄erentiation.
13Observe that the full market coverage condition (v ￿ pi ￿ t(1 ￿ ‘i)
2 ￿ 0) implies
that
v￿pi
t(1￿‘i)2 ￿ 1: Since consumers are uniformly distributed with density 1, we have that
v￿pi
t(1￿‘i)2 = 1 : that is, all the consumers who are captive to ￿rm i buy from ￿rm i with
14that ￿rm i faces is:










2t(1 ￿ ‘i ￿ ‘j)
￿
(13)
and its objective function is given by
￿i = piDi (p1;p2;￿1;￿2;a;b)￿￿￿
2
i=2;i = 1;2: (14)
Taking the ￿rst order conditions of (14) with respect to pi and ￿i;i = 1;2 for
given locations (‘i and ‘j) and setting them equal to zero we obtain
@￿i=@pi = 0 and @￿i=@￿i = 0;i = 1;2: (15)
Solving the equations @￿i=@pi = 0 simultaneously for the prices pi;i =
1;2, given locations and the advertising intensities yields













;i 6= j: (16)
We saw earlier (p. 7) that when advertising is non-strategic, equilibrium
prices are independent of the advertising level. It is immediate from (16)
that the advertising intensity does a⁄ect prices. The question therefore is
one of the nature of the relationship between the advertising intensity and
prices. Since ￿i and ￿j;j 6= i are in the denominator, visual inspection of (16)
shows that higher advertising is associated with lower prices (@pi=@￿i < 0
and @pi=@￿j < 0): An inspection of the demand function helps to build the
intuition:
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15All else equal, an increase in ￿i raises both the proportion of consumers cap-




) and the proportion of consumers who are fully
informed and thus selective (￿i￿j). If ￿j is high, then the increase in the




is small) while the share of selective consumers increases signi￿-
cantly. Thus, given the larger selective segment facing both ￿rms, the ￿rms
will compete aggressively for these consumers thereby causing the negative
relationship between advertising and prices. Intuitively higher advertising,
by increasing the proportion of selective consumers in the market, raises the
relative importance of these consumers (relative to the captive consumers).14
As a result, ￿rms compete more aggressively for these consumers.
Due to complexity, it is not possible to solve the equations (15) simulta-
neously for pi;pj;￿i and ￿j: Instead, we solve for a symmetric equilibrium,













It is immediate from (17) that as ￿rms locate close together (a and b in-
crease) price competition intensi￿es thereby squeezing margins. When ￿rms
move close together, (endogenous) product di⁄erentiation is reduced and as
a result consumers become less captive to their nearest store (products are
more substitutable). With less monopoly power over the consumers on one￿ s
turf, ￿rms compete vigorously for the consumers on each other￿ s turf.
Substituting (17) and (18) into (14) and taking the ￿rst order condition
with respect to ￿rm 1￿ s location choice a; and solving for a symmetric equi-
14In a symmetric advertising equilibrium (￿1 = ￿2 = ￿), the proportion of captive
consumers is given by ￿(1 ￿ ￿) while the fraction of fully informed consumers is ￿
2. Now,
@






= 2￿ > 08￿:
16librium in location we obtain15







Unlike Schultz (2004) and/or our earlier model where advertising is non-
strategic, in the present model, the optimal location is a function of the
advertising cost parameter ￿: Observe that ￿ = 2t implies b a = b b = 0: That
is, ￿rms locate at the extreme points of the linear city (as in D￿ Aspremont et
al (1979)). Firm 1 locates at point 0 and ￿rm 2 locates at point 1. If ￿ > 2t;
then b a = b b < 0: That is, ￿rms locate outside the unit interval (as in Schultz
(2004)). For ￿ < 2t; b a = b b > 0: That is, ￿rms locate inside the unit interval.
However, ￿rms will never ￿nd it optimal to locate at the center of the market,
that is, b a = b b 6= 1=2:16 Again we see that ￿rms di⁄erentiate their products
but not fully (Tirole (1988: 286-287) discusses possible explanations for why
￿rms may choose not to di⁄erentiate their products fully).
Substituting (19) into (17) and (18) we obtain




























and substituting for b p and b ￿ from (20) and (21) yields














15The expressions are quite complex so much that it is impossible to check for the second
order conditions.
16Prescott and Visscher (1977) show that ￿rms have incentives to locate "far apart" but
not necessarily at the extreme points.
17Equations (19) ￿(22) can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 An increase in the advertising cost parameter ￿ reduces mar-
ket transparency and induces ￿rms to di⁄erentiate their products more. This
softens price competition and increases ￿rms￿pro￿ts.







































Intuitively, when advertising becomes more costly, ￿rms respond by re-
ducing advertising. This reduction in advertising gives rise to the "strategic
e⁄ect" (Tirole, 1988: 293). A reduction in the advertising intensity increases
informational product di⁄erentiation and thus allows for softening of price
competition.17 Observe that consumers who receive advertising from both
￿rms can make across ￿rm price comparisons and thus buy from the ￿rm
quoting the lowest ￿ delivered￿price. On the other hand, captive consumers
are "totally" price insensitive. When the advertising cost is low (advertising
intensity is high), a greater proportion of the market is fully informed and
thus ￿rms compete aggressively for this segment of the market and compe-
tition to sell to these consumers drives the price down. However, when the
advertising cost is high (advertising intensity low), the tables are turned as a
lesser proportion of the market is now fully informed. In this case, the cap-
tive consumers are relatively more pro￿table as the optimal price applicable
to this group is higher compared to that applicable to the fully informed
group. Thus, high advertising costs soften price competition by constraining
the proportion of fully informed consumers and hence limiting comparison
shopping (Simbanegavi, 2009). Also, when advertising becomes more ex-
pensive, ￿rms, in addition to reducing their advertising intensity, also raises
17Observe that this dynamic was non-existent in the model of Section 2 where advertising
was nonstrategic.
18product diversity. This adds to the softening of price competition thereby
allowing ￿rms to charge higher prices.
That pro￿ts increase with the advertising cost simply means that the
strategic e⁄ects (resulting from increased product di⁄erentiation and reduced
advertising) outweigh the direct e⁄ect of higher advertising cost on the ad-
vertising outlays. The above result has important implications for consumer
welfare: High advertising costs, by constraining informative advertising, ex-
acerbates product di⁄erentiation and thus softens price competition to the
detriment of consumers. This points to the importance of policies that pro-
mote and /or lower the costs of advertising.
In the Grossman and Shapiro model, ￿rms are (exogenously) located at
the end points of a unit interval and they simultaneously decide on price and
advertising. As we pointed out in the introduction, our model extends the
Grossman and Shapiro (1984) analysis to the case where product di⁄eren-
tiation is endogenous. The question of interest here is the following: What
are the additional implications, if any, that ￿ ow from our relaxing of the
assumption of exogenous product di⁄erentiation?
The equilibrium price, advertising and pro￿t in the Grossman and Shapiro





















Comparing b p to pGS; b ￿ to ￿
GS and b ￿ to ￿GS we obtain the following:
b p > pGS
b ￿ > ￿
GS




if ￿ > 2t and
b p ￿ pGS
b ￿ ￿ ￿
GS




for ￿ ￿ 2t: (26)
19Thus for ￿ > 2t; equilibrium prices and the equilibrium advertising inten-
sities are higher when product di⁄erentiation is endogenous. As we showed
earlier, if ￿ > 2t; b a = b b < 0: That is, ￿rms locate outside the unit interval
thereby according more di⁄erentiation (and thus greater softening of price
competition) than in the standard Grossman and Shapiro model.18 On the
other hand, for ￿ < 2t; b a = b b > 0: That is, ￿rms di⁄erentiate their prod-
ucts less than the exogenous product di⁄erentiation accorded in the standard
Grossman and Shapiro model. The result is more vigorous price competition
than in the model of Grossman and Shapiro, other things being equal. This
explains the lower price (b p < pGS).
As equation (26) shows, b ￿ ￿ ￿
GS if ￿ ￿ 2t: This is quite intuitive. When
￿ < 2t; b a = b b > 0 implying that the ￿rms￿products are less di⁄erentiated
than in the standard Grossman and Shapiro model (where ￿rms are located
at the extremes of unit interval). In this case, ￿rms advertise less as a way
to soften price competition. By advertising less, ￿rms increase informational
product di⁄erentiation which accords them more "monopoly power". With
respect to pro￿ts, we ￿nd that b ￿ > ￿GS if ￿ > 2t: That is, pro￿ts are higher
with endogenous product di⁄erentiation for ￿ ￿ 2t: As we pointed out earlier,
for ￿ > 2t; ￿rms locate outside the unit interval and they also advertise
more than they would were di⁄erentiation exogenous. Consequently, pro￿ts
are higher than in the standard Grossman and Shapiro model. However,
when ￿ < 2t; product di⁄erentiation is weak (products more similar) and
the resulting tough price competition erodes potential pro￿ts. Consequently,
￿rms earn lower pro￿ts than in the Grossman and Shapiro (1984) model.
The implications for consumer welfare however are not obvious though.
When the advertising cost is high, more consumers are informed (which is
good for welfare) but they pay higher prices (bad for welfare).19 In addition,
18Put di⁄erently, locating outside [0;1] raises the consumers￿shopping costs and thus
makes them more captive to their nearest store. In this way, endogenous product di⁄er-
entiation reinforces exogenous product di⁄erentiation. This gives the ￿rms more market
power and thus softens price competition.
19In terms of overall welfare however, higher prices are not necessarily welfare reducing
20because ￿rms locate further apart, total transportation costs are higher ￿
implying lower consumer surplus. Thus, a proper examination is required
if we are to make de￿nitive statements about the welfare implications of
endogenizing product di⁄erentiation. This we leave for future research.
6 Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to "kill two birds with one stone". We extend
Schultz￿ s (2004) model by endogenizing market transparency and Grossman
and Shapiro￿ s (1984) seminal model by endogenizing product di⁄erentiation.
We ￿nd that Schultz￿ s result is reversed. In particular, an increase in market
transparency raises ￿rm pro￿ts but has no e⁄ect on product di⁄erentiation.
Furthermore, endogenizing market transparency leads to less product dif-
ferentiation, more price competition and lower pro￿ts. Because consumers
pay lower prices, endogenizing market transparency raises consumer welfare.
The intuition is that pro￿tability requires ￿rms to recoup the advertising
outlays. This creates a strong incentive for ￿rms to compete aggressively by
undercutting each other.
In the extended model ￿rms, in addition to competing on locations and
prices, also compete on advertising. We ￿nd that a reduction in the ad-
vertising cost parameter (analogous to an increase in market transparency)
leads to more advertising, less product di⁄erentiation and lower prices and
pro￿ts. This is explained by the business stealing e⁄ect. Because ￿rms adver-
tise more when the cost of advertising is low, the resulting "bigger" market
creates incentives for business stealing. Consequently, product diversity is
reduced. Also, the strategic e⁄ect (reduced informational product di⁄eren-
tiation) works to increase competitiveness as a higher advertising intensity
implies greater scope for comparison shopping. Thus, a decrease in the ad-
vertising cost favours consumers and hurts ￿rms.
as they constitute only a transfer from consumers to ￿rms. By de￿nition, welfare equals
pro￿ts plus consumer surplus.
21Appendix A.
A.1. Comparison with Schultz (2004)
In Schultz (2004), the equilibrium locations, prices and pro￿ts are given by:
aS = bS =
7￿￿9
8￿ < 0; pS = 3
4
(3￿￿)t
￿2 and ￿S = 3
8
(3￿￿)t
￿2 (p. 176), where S is
a mnemonic for Schultz. The ￿ optimal￿quantities (in the sense that market
transparency is endogenously determined) are denoted by a star (*). Thus
a￿; p￿;￿
￿ and ￿￿ are given by equations (9), (10), (11) and (12) respectively.
Locations Let ￿
￿ = 3t
4￿: Then, aS￿a￿ =
7￿￿9
8￿ j￿￿ ￿￿1
4 = ￿ 3
8t (4￿ ￿ 3t) < 0
for all ￿ > 3t
4 : Thus ￿rms locate close together than is implied by Schultz
(2004).
Prices pS = 3
4
(3￿￿)t








2 = ￿ 1
2t
￿




pS ￿ p￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿= 3t
4 = 0: Observe that pS j￿￿ = ￿1




t (t ￿ 8￿) > 0 for all ￿ ￿ t
8 while
@(p￿)
@￿ = 0: Thus pS and p￿ diverge as
￿ increases. It follows therefore that pS ￿ p￿ > 0 for all ￿ > 3t
4 : That is,
equilibrium prices are lower under endogenous market transparency.












￿S ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿= 3t
4 = 3t
8 > 0: Moreover, ￿S j￿￿ = ￿ 1




2t (t ￿ 8￿) > 0 for all ￿ ￿ t
8: On the other hand, @￿￿
@￿ < 0 for all ￿: Since
22￿ ￿ 3t
4 for our purposes, we conclude that ￿S ￿ ￿￿ > 0: That is, pro￿ts are
lower under endogenous market transparency.








































2 = pGS () 2t￿
2 ￿ (2t￿)
3
2 : Dividing both sides
by ￿
3





































































Since the denominator is positive, b ￿￿￿










0: Simplifying and solving for ￿ we have that b ￿ ￿ ￿
GS () ￿ ￿ 2t: Thus















































































































































￿ 0: But this is straight forward. Simplifying and solving for ￿ yields ￿ ￿ 2t:
Thus, pro￿ts are higher with endogenous product di⁄erentiation than with
exogenous product di⁄erentiation for ￿ ￿ 2t:
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